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authorMichael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>2021-10-01 23:05:04 +0200
committerMichael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>2021-10-01 23:05:04 +0200
commite74c568b07b50b97873fb4ee1d776dedefbd54d6 (patch)
tree3469f17ea9af91f7ff169b890633bda68b0cf76e /src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c
parentbfe522304da217296e2a61040f58e35ec5d6f3f2 (diff)
New upstream version 1.32.12 upstream/1.32.12
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c')
-rw-r--r--src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c693
1 files changed, 693 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c b/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..55024bb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-macsec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include "libnm-core-impl/nm-default-libnm-core.h"
+
+#include "nm-setting-macsec.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "libnm-glib-aux/nm-secret-utils.h"
+
+#include "nm-utils.h"
+#include "nm-setting-connection.h"
+#include "nm-setting-private.h"
+#include "nm-setting-wired.h"
+#include "nm-connection-private.h"
+
+/**
+ * SECTION:nm-setting-macsec
+ * @short_description: Describes connection properties for MACSEC interfaces
+ *
+ * The #NMSettingMacsec object is a #NMSetting subclass that describes properties
+ * necessary for connection to MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) interfaces.
+ **/
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+NM_GOBJECT_PROPERTIES_DEFINE_BASE(PROP_PARENT,
+                                  PROP_MODE,
+                                  PROP_ENCRYPT,
+                                  PROP_MKA_CAK,
+                                  PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
+                                  PROP_MKA_CKN,
+                                  PROP_PORT,
+                                  PROP_VALIDATION,
+                                  PROP_SEND_SCI, );
+
+typedef struct {
+    char *                    parent;
+    char *                    mka_cak;
+    char *                    mka_ckn;
+    int                       port;
+    NMSettingMacsecMode       mode;
+    NMSettingSecretFlags      mka_cak_flags;
+    NMSettingMacsecValidation validation;
+    bool                      encrypt : 1;
+    bool                      send_sci : 1;
+} NMSettingMacsecPrivate;
+
+/**
+ * NMSettingMacsec:
+ *
+ * MACSec Settings
+ */
+struct _NMSettingMacsec {
+    NMSetting parent;
+    /* In the past, this struct was public API. Preserve ABI! */
+};
+
+struct _NMSettingMacsecClass {
+    NMSettingClass parent;
+    /* In the past, this struct was public API. Preserve ABI! */
+    gpointer padding[4];
+};
+
+G_DEFINE_TYPE(NMSettingMacsec, nm_setting_macsec, NM_TYPE_SETTING)
+
+#define NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(o) \
+    (G_TYPE_INSTANCE_GET_PRIVATE((o), NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NMSettingMacsecPrivate))
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_parent:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:parent property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+const char *
+nm_setting_macsec_get_parent(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->parent;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_mode:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mode property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+NMSettingMacsecMode
+nm_setting_macsec_get_mode(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:encrypt property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+gboolean
+nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->encrypt;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+const char *
+nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+NMSettingSecretFlags
+nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE);
+
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak_flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+const char *
+nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_ckn;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_port:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:port property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+int
+nm_setting_macsec_get_port(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), 1);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->port;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_validation:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:validation property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+NMSettingMacsecValidation
+nm_setting_macsec_get_validation(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_DISABLE);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->validation;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci:
+ * @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
+ *
+ * Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:send-sci property of the setting
+ *
+ * Since: 1.12
+ **/
+gboolean
+nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
+{
+    g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
+    return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->send_sci;
+}
+
+static GPtrArray *
+need_secrets(NMSetting *setting)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv    = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
+    GPtrArray *             secrets = NULL;
+
+    if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
+        if (!priv->mka_cak
+            && !NM_FLAGS_HAS(priv->mka_cak_flags, NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED)) {
+            secrets = g_ptr_array_sized_new(1);
+            g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return secrets;
+}
+
+/*********************************************************************/
+
+static gboolean
+verify_macsec_key(const char *key, gboolean cak, GError **error)
+{
+    int req_len;
+
+    /* CAK is a connection secret and can be NULL for various
+     * reasons (agent-owned, no permissions to get secrets, etc.)
+     */
+    if (cak && !key)
+        return TRUE;
+
+    if (!key || !key[0]) {
+        g_set_error_literal(error,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                            _("the key is empty"));
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    req_len = cak ? NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_LENGTH : NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN_LENGTH;
+    if (strlen(key) != (gsize) req_len) {
+        g_set_error(error,
+                    NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                    NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                    _("the key must be %d characters"),
+                    req_len);
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!NM_STRCHAR_ALL(key, ch, g_ascii_isxdigit(ch))) {
+        g_set_error_literal(error,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                            _("the key contains non-hexadecimal characters"));
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+verify(NMSetting *setting, NMConnection *connection, GError **error)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv    = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
+    NMSettingConnection *   s_con   = NULL;
+    NMSettingWired *        s_wired = NULL;
+    NMSetting8021x *        s_8021x = NULL;
+
+    if (connection) {
+        s_con   = nm_connection_get_setting_connection(connection);
+        s_wired = nm_connection_get_setting_wired(connection);
+        s_8021x = nm_connection_get_setting_802_1x(connection);
+    }
+
+    if (priv->parent) {
+        if (nm_utils_is_uuid(priv->parent)) {
+            /* If we have an NMSettingConnection:master with slave-type="macsec",
+             * then it must be the same UUID.
+             */
+            if (s_con) {
+                const char *master = NULL, *slave_type = NULL;
+
+                slave_type = nm_setting_connection_get_slave_type(s_con);
+                if (!g_strcmp0(slave_type, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME))
+                    master = nm_setting_connection_get_master(s_con);
+
+                if (master && g_strcmp0(priv->parent, master) != 0) {
+                    g_set_error(error,
+                                NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                                NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                                _("'%s' value doesn't match '%s=%s'"),
+                                priv->parent,
+                                NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_MASTER,
+                                master);
+                    g_prefix_error(error,
+                                   "%s.%s: ",
+                                   NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                                   NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
+                    return FALSE;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (!nm_utils_iface_valid_name(priv->parent)) {
+            /* parent must be either a UUID or an interface name */
+            g_set_error(error,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                        _("'%s' is neither an UUID nor an interface name"),
+                        priv->parent);
+            g_prefix_error(error,
+                           "%s.%s: ",
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* If parent is NULL, the parent must be specified via
+         * NMSettingWired:mac-address.
+         */
+        if (connection && (!s_wired || !nm_setting_wired_get_mac_address(s_wired))) {
+            g_set_error(error,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
+                        _("property is not specified and neither is '%s:%s'"),
+                        NM_SETTING_WIRED_SETTING_NAME,
+                        NM_SETTING_WIRED_MAC_ADDRESS);
+            g_prefix_error(error,
+                           "%s.%s: ",
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
+        if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_ckn, FALSE, error)) {
+            g_prefix_error(error,
+                           "%s.%s: ",
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+        if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_cak, TRUE, error)) {
+            g_prefix_error(error,
+                           "%s.%s: ",
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                           NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+    } else if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_EAP) {
+        if (!s_8021x) {
+            g_set_error(error,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                        NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_SETTING,
+                        _("EAP key management requires '%s' setting presence"),
+                        NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME);
+            g_prefix_error(error, "%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+    } else {
+        g_set_error_literal(error,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                            _("must be either psk (0) or eap (1)"));
+        g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE);
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (priv->port <= 0 || priv->port > 65534) {
+        g_set_error(error,
+                    NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                    NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
+                    _("invalid port %d"),
+                    priv->port);
+        g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT);
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (priv->mode != NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK && (priv->mka_cak || priv->mka_ckn)) {
+        g_set_error_literal(error,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
+                            NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
+                            _("only valid for psk mode"));
+        g_prefix_error(error,
+                       "%s.%s: ",
+                       NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
+                       priv->mka_cak ? NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK : NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
+        return NM_SETTING_VERIFY_NORMALIZABLE;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+static void
+get_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsec *       setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv    = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
+
+    switch (prop_id) {
+    case PROP_PARENT:
+        g_value_set_string(value, priv->parent);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MODE:
+        g_value_set_int(value, priv->mode);
+        break;
+    case PROP_ENCRYPT:
+        g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->encrypt);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CAK:
+        g_value_set_string(value, priv->mka_cak);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
+        g_value_set_flags(value, priv->mka_cak_flags);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CKN:
+        g_value_set_string(value, priv->mka_ckn);
+        break;
+    case PROP_PORT:
+        g_value_set_int(value, priv->port);
+        break;
+    case PROP_VALIDATION:
+        g_value_set_int(value, priv->validation);
+        break;
+    case PROP_SEND_SCI:
+        g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->send_sci);
+        break;
+    default:
+        G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+set_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, const GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsec *       setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv    = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
+
+    switch (prop_id) {
+    case PROP_PARENT:
+        g_free(priv->parent);
+        priv->parent = g_value_dup_string(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MODE:
+        priv->mode = g_value_get_int(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_ENCRYPT:
+        priv->encrypt = g_value_get_boolean(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CAK:
+        nm_free_secret(priv->mka_cak);
+        priv->mka_cak = g_value_dup_string(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
+        priv->mka_cak_flags = g_value_get_flags(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_MKA_CKN:
+        g_free(priv->mka_ckn);
+        priv->mka_ckn = g_value_dup_string(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_PORT:
+        priv->port = g_value_get_int(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_VALIDATION:
+        priv->validation = g_value_get_int(value);
+        break;
+    case PROP_SEND_SCI:
+        priv->send_sci = g_value_get_boolean(value);
+        break;
+    default:
+        G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+static void
+nm_setting_macsec_init(NMSettingMacsec *self)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(self);
+
+    nm_assert(priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
+    priv->encrypt    = TRUE;
+    priv->port       = 1;
+    priv->send_sci   = TRUE;
+    priv->validation = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nm_setting_macsec_new:
+ *
+ * Creates a new #NMSettingMacsec object with default values.
+ *
+ * Returns: (transfer full): the new empty #NMSettingMacsec object
+ *
+ * Since: 1.6
+ **/
+NMSetting *
+nm_setting_macsec_new(void)
+{
+    return g_object_new(NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+finalize(GObject *object)
+{
+    NMSettingMacsec *       setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
+    NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv    = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
+
+    g_free(priv->parent);
+    nm_free_secret(priv->mka_cak);
+    g_free(priv->mka_ckn);
+
+    G_OBJECT_CLASS(nm_setting_macsec_parent_class)->finalize(object);
+}
+
+static void
+nm_setting_macsec_class_init(NMSettingMacsecClass *klass)
+{
+    GObjectClass *  object_class        = G_OBJECT_CLASS(klass);
+    NMSettingClass *setting_class       = NM_SETTING_CLASS(klass);
+    GArray *        properties_override = _nm_sett_info_property_override_create_array();
+
+    g_type_class_add_private(klass, sizeof(NMSettingMacsecPrivate));
+
+    object_class->get_property = get_property;
+    object_class->set_property = set_property;
+    object_class->finalize     = finalize;
+
+    setting_class->verify       = verify;
+    setting_class->need_secrets = need_secrets;
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:parent:
+     *
+     * If given, specifies the parent interface name or parent connection UUID
+     * from which this MACSEC interface should be created.  If this property is
+     * not specified, the connection must contain an #NMSettingWired setting
+     * with a #NMSettingWired:mac-address property.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_PARENT] = g_param_spec_string(
+        NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT,
+        "",
+        "",
+        NULL,
+        G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:mode:
+     *
+     * Specifies how the CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MKA (MACsec Key
+     * Agreement) is obtained.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_MODE] =
+        g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE,
+                         "",
+                         "",
+                         G_MININT,
+                         G_MAXINT,
+                         NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK,
+                         G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:encrypt:
+     *
+     * Whether the transmitted traffic must be encrypted.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    _nm_setting_property_define_boolean(properties_override,
+                                        obj_properties,
+                                        NM_SETTING_MACSEC_ENCRYPT,
+                                        PROP_ENCRYPT,
+                                        TRUE,
+                                        NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE,
+                                        nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak:
+     *
+     * The pre-shared CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MACsec
+     * Key Agreement.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK] =
+        g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK,
+                            "",
+                            "",
+                            NULL,
+                            G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak-flags:
+     *
+     * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
+     * property.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS] =
+        g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
+                           "",
+                           "",
+                           NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS,
+                           NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE,
+                           G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn:
+     *
+     * The pre-shared CKN (Connectivity-association Key Name) for
+     * MACsec Key Agreement.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CKN] = g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN,
+                                                       "",
+                                                       "",
+                                                       NULL,
+                                                       G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:port:
+     *
+     * The port component of the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier), between 1 and 65534.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_PORT] =
+        g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT,
+                         "",
+                         "",
+                         1,
+                         65534,
+                         1,
+                         G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:validation:
+     *
+     * Specifies the validation mode for incoming frames.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.6
+     **/
+    obj_properties[PROP_VALIDATION] =
+        g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
+                         "",
+                         "",
+                         G_MININT,
+                         G_MAXINT,
+                         NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT,
+                         G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+
+    /**
+     * NMSettingMacsec:send-sci:
+     *
+     * Specifies whether the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier) is included
+     * in every packet.
+     *
+     * Since: 1.12
+     **/
+    _nm_setting_property_define_boolean(properties_override,
+                                        obj_properties,
+                                        NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SEND_SCI,
+                                        PROP_SEND_SCI,
+                                        TRUE,
+                                        NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE,
+                                        nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci);
+
+    g_object_class_install_properties(object_class, _PROPERTY_ENUMS_LAST, obj_properties);
+
+    _nm_setting_class_commit_full(setting_class,
+                                  NM_META_SETTING_TYPE_MACSEC,
+                                  NULL,
+                                  properties_override);
+}