diff options
| author | Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> | 2021-10-01 23:05:04 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> | 2021-10-01 23:05:04 +0200 |
| commit | e74c568b07b50b97873fb4ee1d776dedefbd54d6 (patch) | |
| tree | 3469f17ea9af91f7ff169b890633bda68b0cf76e /src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c | |
| parent | bfe522304da217296e2a61040f58e35ec5d6f3f2 (diff) | |
New upstream version 1.32.12 upstream/1.32.12
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c | 4655 |
1 files changed, 4655 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c b/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6ddbd680 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/libnm-core-impl/nm-setting-8021x.c @@ -0,0 +1,4655 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2007 - 2013 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2007 - 2008 Novell, Inc. + */ + +#include "libnm-core-impl/nm-default-libnm-core.h" + +#include "nm-setting-8021x.h" + +#include "libnm-glib-aux/nm-secret-utils.h" +#include "nm-utils.h" +#include "nm-crypto.h" +#include "nm-utils-private.h" +#include "nm-setting-private.h" +#include "nm-core-enum-types.h" + +/** + * SECTION:nm-setting-8021x + * @short_description: Describes 802.1x-authenticated connection properties + * + * The #NMSetting8021x object is a #NMSetting subclass that describes + * properties necessary for connection to 802.1x-authenticated networks, such as + * WPA and WPA2 Enterprise Wi-Fi networks and wired 802.1x networks. 802.1x + * connections typically use certificates and/or EAP authentication methods to + * securely verify, identify, and authenticate the client to the network itself, + * instead of simply relying on a widely shared static key. + * + * It's a good idea to read up on wpa_supplicant configuration before using this + * setting extensively, since most of the options here correspond closely with + * the relevant wpa_supplicant configuration options. + * + * Furthermore, to get a good idea of 802.1x, EAP, TLS, TTLS, etc and their + * applications to Wi-Fi and wired networks, you'll want to get copies of the + * following books. + * + * 802.11 Wireless Networks: The Definitive Guide, Second Edition + * Author: Matthew Gast + * ISBN: 978-0596100520 + * + * Cisco Wireless LAN Security + * Authors: Krishna Sankar, Sri Sundaralingam, Darrin Miller, and Andrew Balinsky + * ISBN: 978-1587051548 + **/ + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +static NMSetting8021xCKFormat +_crypto_format_to_ck(NMCryptoFileFormat format) +{ + G_STATIC_ASSERT((NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN + == (NMSetting8021xCKFormat) NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN)); + G_STATIC_ASSERT( + (NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_X509 == (NMSetting8021xCKFormat) NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_X509)); + G_STATIC_ASSERT((NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_RAW_KEY + == (NMSetting8021xCKFormat) NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_RAW_KEY)); + G_STATIC_ASSERT((NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_PKCS12 + == (NMSetting8021xCKFormat) NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_PKCS12)); + + nm_assert(NM_IN_SET(format, + NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN, + NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_X509, + NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_RAW_KEY, + NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_PKCS12)); + return (NMSetting8021xCKFormat) format; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +typedef void (*EAPMethodNeedSecretsFunc)(NMSetting8021x *self, GPtrArray *secrets, gboolean phase2); + +typedef gboolean (*EAPMethodValidateFunc)(NMSetting8021x *self, gboolean phase2, GError **error); + +typedef struct { + const char * method; + EAPMethodNeedSecretsFunc ns_func; + EAPMethodValidateFunc v_func; +} EAPMethodsTable; + +static const EAPMethodsTable eap_methods_table[]; + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +NM_GOBJECT_PROPERTIES_DEFINE(NMSetting8021x, + PROP_EAP, + PROP_IDENTITY, + PROP_ANONYMOUS_IDENTITY, + PROP_PAC_FILE, + PROP_CA_CERT, + PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_CA_PATH, + PROP_SUBJECT_MATCH, + PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES, + PROP_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH, + PROP_DOMAIN_MATCH, + PROP_CLIENT_CERT, + PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PHASE1_PEAPVER, + PROP_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL, + PROP_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING, + PROP_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS, + PROP_PHASE2_AUTH, + PROP_PHASE2_AUTHEAP, + PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT, + PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PHASE2_CA_PATH, + PROP_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH, + PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES, + PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH, + PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH, + PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT, + PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PASSWORD, + PROP_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PASSWORD_RAW, + PROP_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS, + PROP_PRIVATE_KEY, + PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD, + PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY, + PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD, + PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + PROP_PIN, + PROP_PIN_FLAGS, + PROP_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS, + PROP_OPTIONAL, + PROP_AUTH_TIMEOUT, ); + +typedef struct { + GSList * eap; /* GSList of strings */ + char * identity; + char * anonymous_identity; + char * pac_file; + GBytes * ca_cert; + char * ca_cert_password; + char * ca_path; + char * subject_match; + GSList * altsubject_matches; + char * domain_suffix_match; + char * domain_match; + GBytes * client_cert; + char * client_cert_password; + char * phase1_peapver; + char * phase1_peaplabel; + char * phase1_fast_provisioning; + char * phase2_auth; + char * phase2_autheap; + GBytes * phase2_ca_cert; + char * phase2_ca_cert_password; + char * phase2_ca_path; + char * phase2_subject_match; + GSList * phase2_altsubject_matches; + char * phase2_domain_suffix_match; + char * phase2_domain_match; + GBytes * phase2_client_cert; + char * phase2_client_cert_password; + char * password; + GBytes * password_raw; + char * pin; + GBytes * private_key; + char * private_key_password; + GBytes * phase2_private_key; + char * phase2_private_key_password; + int auth_timeout; + NMSetting8021xAuthFlags phase1_auth_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags ca_cert_password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags client_cert_password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags phase2_ca_cert_password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags phase2_client_cert_password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags password_raw_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags pin_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags private_key_password_flags; + NMSettingSecretFlags phase2_private_key_password_flags; + bool optional : 1; + bool system_ca_certs : 1; +} NMSetting8021xPrivate; + +/** + * NMSetting8021x: + * + * IEEE 802.1x Authentication Settings + */ +struct _NMSetting8021x { + NMSetting parent; + /* In the past, this struct was public API. Preserve ABI! */ +}; + +struct _NMSetting8021xClass { + NMSettingClass parent; + /* In the past, this struct was public API. Preserve ABI! */ + gpointer padding[4]; +}; + +G_DEFINE_TYPE(NMSetting8021x, nm_setting_802_1x, NM_TYPE_SETTING) + +#define NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(o) \ + (G_TYPE_INSTANCE_GET_PRIVATE((o), NM_TYPE_SETTING_802_1X, NMSetting8021xPrivate)) + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_check_cert_scheme: + * @pdata: (allow-none): the data pointer + * @length: the length of the data + * @error: (allow-none) (out): validation reason + * + * Determines and verifies the blob type. + * When setting certificate properties of NMSetting8021x + * the blob must be not UNKNOWN (or NULL). + * + * Returns: the scheme of the blob or %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN. + * For NULL it also returns NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN. + * + * Since: 1.2 + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_check_cert_scheme(gconstpointer pdata, gsize length, GError **error) +{ + const char * data = pdata; + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme; + gsize prefix_length; + + g_return_val_if_fail(!length || data, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN); + + if (!length || !data) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("binary data missing")); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN; + } + + if (length >= NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH) + && !memcmp(data, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH, + NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH))) { + scheme = NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH; + prefix_length = NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH); + } else if (length >= NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PKCS11) + && !memcmp(data, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PKCS11, + NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PKCS11))) { + scheme = NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11; + prefix_length = NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PKCS11); + } else { + scheme = NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB; + prefix_length = 0; + } + + if (scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB) { + /* An actual URI must be NUL terminated, contain at least + * one non-NUL character, and contain only one trailing NUL + * character. + * And ensure it's UTF-8 valid too so we can pass it through + * D-Bus and stuff like that. */ + + if (data[length - 1] != '\0') { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("URI not NUL terminated")); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN; + } + length--; + + if (length <= prefix_length) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("URI is empty")); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN; + } + + if (!g_utf8_validate(data + prefix_length, length - prefix_length, NULL)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("URI is not valid UTF-8")); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN; + } + } + + return scheme; +} + +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +_nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme(GBytes *bytes, GError **error) +{ + const char *data; + gsize length; + + if (!bytes) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("data missing")); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN; + } + + data = g_bytes_get_data(bytes, &length); + return nm_setting_802_1x_check_cert_scheme(data, length, error); +} + +static gboolean +_cert_verify_scheme(NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, GBytes *bytes, GError **error) +{ + GError * local = NULL; + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme_detected; + + nm_assert(bytes); + + scheme_detected = _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme(bytes, &local); + if (scheme_detected == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("certificate is invalid: %s"), + local->message); + return FALSE; + } + + if (scheme_detected != scheme) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("certificate detected as invalid scheme")); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +GBytes * +_nm_setting_802_1x_cert_value_to_bytes(NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + const guint8 * val_bin, + gssize val_len, + GError ** error) +{ + gs_unref_bytes GBytes *bytes = NULL; + guint8 * mem; + gsize total_len; + + nm_assert(val_bin); + + switch (scheme) { + case NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11: + if (val_len < 0) + val_len = strlen((char *) val_bin) + 1; + + bytes = g_bytes_new(val_bin, val_len); + break; + case NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH: + if (val_len < 0) + val_len = strlen((char *) val_bin) + 1; + + total_len = NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH) + ((gsize) val_len); + + mem = g_new(guint8, total_len); + memcpy(mem, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH, + NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH)); + memcpy(&mem[NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH)], val_bin, val_len); + bytes = g_bytes_new_take(mem, total_len); + break; + default: + g_return_val_if_reached(NULL); + } + + if (!_cert_verify_scheme(scheme, bytes, error)) + return NULL; + + return g_steal_pointer(&bytes); +} + +static const char * +_cert_get_path(GBytes *bytes) +{ + const guint8 *bin; + + nm_assert(bytes); + nm_assert(g_bytes_get_size(bytes) >= NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH)); + + bin = g_bytes_get_data(bytes, NULL); + + nm_assert(bin); + nm_assert(bin[g_bytes_get_size(bytes) - 1] == '\0'); + nm_assert(g_str_has_prefix((const char *) bin, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH)); + + return (const char *) &bin[NM_STRLEN(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CERT_SCHEME_PREFIX_PATH)]; +} + +#define _cert_assert_scheme(cert, check_scheme, ret_val) \ + G_STMT_START \ + { \ + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme; \ + \ + scheme = _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme((cert), NULL); \ + if (scheme != check_scheme) { \ + g_return_val_if_fail(scheme == check_scheme, ret_val); \ + return ret_val; \ + } \ + } \ + G_STMT_END + +#define _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, cert_field) \ + G_STMT_START \ + { \ + NMSetting8021x *const _setting = (setting); \ + GBytes * _cert; \ + \ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(_setting), NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN); \ + \ + _cert = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(_setting)->cert_field; \ + \ + return _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme(_cert, NULL); \ + } \ + G_STMT_END + +#define _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, cert_field) \ + G_STMT_START \ + { \ + NMSetting8021x *const _setting = (setting); \ + GBytes * _cert; \ + \ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(_setting), NULL); \ + \ + _cert = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(_setting)->cert_field; \ + \ + _cert_assert_scheme(_cert, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, NULL); \ + \ + return _cert; \ + } \ + G_STMT_END + +#define _cert_impl_get_path(setting, cert_field) \ + G_STMT_START \ + { \ + NMSetting8021x *const _setting = (setting); \ + GBytes * _cert; \ + \ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(_setting), NULL); \ + \ + _cert = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(_setting)->cert_field; \ + \ + _cert_assert_scheme(_cert, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, NULL); \ + \ + return _cert_get_path(_cert); \ + } \ + G_STMT_END + +#define _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, cert_field) \ + G_STMT_START \ + { \ + NMSetting8021x *const _setting = (setting); \ + GBytes * _cert; \ + \ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(_setting), NULL); \ + \ + _cert = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(_setting)->cert_field; \ + \ + _cert_assert_scheme(_cert, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, NULL); \ + \ + return g_bytes_get_data(_cert, NULL); \ + } \ + G_STMT_END + +static gboolean +_cert_impl_set(NMSetting8021x * setting, + _PropertyEnums property, + const char * value, + const char * password, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + NMCryptoFileFormat format = NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN; + gs_unref_bytes GBytes *cert = NULL; + GBytes ** p_cert = NULL; + GBytes ** p_client_cert = NULL; + char ** p_password = NULL; + _PropertyEnums notify_cert = property; + _PropertyEnums notify_password = PROP_0; + _PropertyEnums notify_client_cert = PROP_0; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(!error || !*error, FALSE); + if (value) { + g_return_val_if_fail(g_utf8_validate(value, -1, NULL), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IN_SET(scheme, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11), + FALSE); + } + + if (!value) { + /* coerce password to %NULL. It should be already. */ + password = NULL; + } + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + + if (!value) { + /* pass. */ + } else if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11) { + cert = _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_value_to_bytes(scheme, (guint8 *) value, -1, error); + if (!cert) + goto err; + } else { + gs_unref_bytes GBytes *file = NULL; + + if (NM_IN_SET(property, PROP_PRIVATE_KEY, PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY)) { + file = nm_crypto_read_file(value, error); + if (!file) + goto err; + format = nm_crypto_verify_private_key_data(g_bytes_get_data(file, NULL), + g_bytes_get_size(file), + password, + NULL, + error); + if (format == NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN) + goto err; + } else { + if (!nm_crypto_load_and_verify_certificate(value, &format, &file, error)) + goto err; + } + + nm_assert(format != NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN); + nm_assert(file); + + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB) { + cert = g_steal_pointer(&file); + if (!_cert_verify_scheme(scheme, cert, error)) + goto err; + } else { + cert = _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_value_to_bytes(scheme, (guint8 *) value, -1, error); + if (!cert) + goto err; + } + } + + switch (property) { + case PROP_CA_CERT: + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT: + if (value && scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && format != NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_X509) { + /* wpa_supplicant can only use raw x509 CA certs */ + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("CA certificate must be in X.509 format")); + goto err; + } + p_cert = (property == PROP_CA_CERT) ? &priv->ca_cert : &priv->phase2_ca_cert; + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT: + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT: + if (value && scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && !NM_IN_SET(format, NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_X509, NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_PKCS12)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("invalid certificate format")); + goto err; + } + p_cert = (property == PROP_CLIENT_CERT) ? &priv->client_cert : &priv->phase2_client_cert; + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY: + p_cert = &priv->private_key; + p_password = &priv->private_key_password; + p_client_cert = &priv->client_cert; + notify_password = PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD; + notify_client_cert = PROP_CLIENT_CERT; + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY: + p_cert = &priv->phase2_private_key; + p_password = &priv->phase2_private_key_password; + p_client_cert = &priv->phase2_client_cert; + notify_password = PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD; + notify_client_cert = PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT; + break; + default: + nm_assert_not_reached(); + break; + } + + /* As required by NM and wpa_supplicant, set the client-cert + * property to the same PKCS#12 data. + */ + if (cert && p_client_cert && format == NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_PKCS12 + && !nm_gbytes_equal0(cert, *p_client_cert)) { + g_bytes_unref(*p_client_cert); + *p_client_cert = g_bytes_ref(cert); + } else + notify_client_cert = PROP_0; + + if (p_cert && !nm_gbytes_equal0(cert, *p_cert)) { + g_bytes_unref(*p_cert); + *p_cert = g_steal_pointer(&cert); + } else + notify_cert = PROP_0; + + if (p_password && !nm_streq0(password, *p_password)) { + nm_free_secret(*p_password); + *p_password = g_strdup(password); + } else + notify_password = PROP_0; + + nm_gobject_notify_together(setting, notify_cert, notify_password, notify_client_cert); + + NM_SET_OUT(out_format, _crypto_format_to_ck(format)); + return TRUE; + +err: + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + obj_properties[property]->name); + NM_SET_OUT(out_format, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN); + return FALSE; +} + +static NMSetting8021xCKFormat +_cert_impl_get_key_format_from_bytes(GBytes *private_key) +{ + const char *path; + GError * error = NULL; + + if (!private_key) + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN; + + switch (_nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme(private_key, NULL)) { + case NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB: + if (nm_crypto_is_pkcs12_data(g_bytes_get_data(private_key, NULL), + g_bytes_get_size(private_key), + NULL)) + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_PKCS12; + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_RAW_KEY; + case NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH: + path = _cert_get_path(private_key); + if (nm_crypto_is_pkcs12_file(path, &error)) + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_PKCS12; + if (error && error->domain == G_FILE_ERROR) { + g_error_free(error); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN; + } + g_error_free(error); + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_RAW_KEY; + default: + break; + } + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN; +} +#define _cert_impl_get_key_format(setting, private_key_field) \ + ({ \ + NMSetting8021x * _setting = (setting); \ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *_priv; \ + \ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(_setting), NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_FORMAT_UNKNOWN); \ + \ + _priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(_setting); \ + _cert_impl_get_key_format_from_bytes(_priv->private_key_field); \ + }) + +static gboolean +_cert_verify_property(GBytes * bytes, + const char *prop_name, + const char *password, + const char *password_prop_name, + GError ** error) +{ + GError * local = NULL; + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme; + + if (!bytes) + return TRUE; + + scheme = _nm_setting_802_1x_cert_get_scheme(bytes, &local); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_UNKNOWN) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("certificate is invalid: %s"), + local->message); + g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, prop_name); + g_error_free(local); + return FALSE; + } + + if (password && (scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11)) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("password is not supported when certificate is not on a PKCS#11 token")); + g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, password_prop_name); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_eap_methods: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the number of eap methods allowed for use when connecting to the + * network. Generally only one EAP method is used. Use the functions + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_eap_method(), nm_setting_802_1x_add_eap_method(), + * and nm_setting_802_1x_remove_eap_method() for adding, removing, and retrieving + * allowed EAP methods. + * + * Returns: the number of allowed EAP methods + **/ +guint32 +nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_eap_methods(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), 0); + + return g_slist_length(NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->eap); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_eap_method: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @i: the index of the EAP method name to return + * + * Returns the name of the allowed EAP method at index @i. + * + * Returns: the name of the allowed EAP method at index @i + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_eap_method(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_return_val_if_fail(i <= g_slist_length(priv->eap), NULL); + + return (const char *) g_slist_nth_data(priv->eap, i); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_add_eap_method: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @eap: the name of the EAP method to allow for this connection + * + * Adds an allowed EAP method. The setting is not valid until at least one + * EAP method has been added. See #NMSetting8021x:eap property for a list of + * allowed EAP methods. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the EAP method was successfully added, %FALSE if it was + * not a valid method or if it was already allowed. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_add_eap_method(NMSetting8021x *setting, const char *eap) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(eap != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->eap; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(eap, (char *) iter->data)) + return FALSE; + } + + priv->eap = g_slist_append(priv->eap, g_ascii_strdown(eap, -1)); + _notify(setting, PROP_EAP); + return TRUE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_eap_method: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @i: the index of the EAP method to remove + * + * Removes the allowed EAP method at the specified index. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_eap_method(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * elt; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + elt = g_slist_nth(priv->eap, i); + g_return_if_fail(elt != NULL); + + g_free(elt->data); + priv->eap = g_slist_delete_link(priv->eap, elt); + _notify(setting, PROP_EAP); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_eap_method_by_value: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @eap: the name of the EAP method to remove + * + * Removes the allowed EAP method @method. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the EAP method was founs and removed, %FALSE if it was not. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_eap_method_by_value(NMSetting8021x *setting, const char *eap) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(eap != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->eap; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(eap, (char *) iter->data)) { + priv->eap = g_slist_delete_link(priv->eap, iter); + _notify(setting, PROP_EAP); + return TRUE; + } + } + return FALSE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_clear_eap_methods: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Clears all allowed EAP methods. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_clear_eap_methods(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_slist_free_full(priv->eap, g_free); + priv->eap = NULL; + _notify(setting, PROP_EAP); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_identity: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the identifier used by some EAP methods (like TLS) to + * authenticate the user. Often this is a username or login name. + * + * Returns: the user identifier + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_identity(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->identity; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_anonymous_identity: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the anonymous identifier used by some EAP methods (like TTLS) to + * authenticate the user in the outer unencrypted "phase 1" authentication. The + * inner "phase 2" authentication will use the #NMSetting8021x:identity in + * a secure form, if applicable for that EAP method. + * + * Returns: the anonymous identifier + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_anonymous_identity(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->anonymous_identity; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_pac_file: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the file containing PAC credentials used by EAP-FAST method. + * + * Returns: the PAC file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_pac_file(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->pac_file; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the path of the CA certificate directory if previously set. Systems + * will often have a directory that contains multiple individual CA certificates + * which the supplicant can then add to the verification chain. This may be + * used in addition to the #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert property to add more CA + * certificates for verifying the network to client. + * + * Returns: the CA certificate directory path + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->ca_path; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_system_ca_certs: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Sets the #NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs property. The + * #NMSetting8021x:ca-path and #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-path + * properties are ignored if the #NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs property is + * %TRUE, in which case a system-wide CA certificate directory specified at + * compile time (using the --system-ca-path configure option) is used in place + * of these properties. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if a system CA certificate path should be used, %FALSE if not + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_get_system_ca_certs(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->system_ca_certs; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the CA certificate. If the returned scheme + * is %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_blob(); + * if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_path(); + * if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the CA certificate (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the CA certificate blob if the CA certificate is stored using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme. Not all EAP methods use a + * CA certificate (LEAP for example), and those that can take advantage of the + * CA certificate allow it to be unset. Note that lack of a CA certificate + * reduces security by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks, because the identity + * of the network cannot be confirmed by the client. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the CA certificate data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the CA certificate path if the CA certificate is stored using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. Not all EAP methods use a + * CA certificate (LEAP for example), and those that can take advantage of the + * CA certificate allow it to be unset. Note that lack of a CA certificate + * reduces security by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks, because the identity + * of the network cannot be confirmed by the client. + * + * Returns: path to the CA certificate file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the CA certificate URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_ca_cert: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH + * or %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the CA certificate + * file (PEM or DER format). The path must be UTF-8 encoded; use + * g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with any @scheme + * clears the CA certificate. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the certificate + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the certificate added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Reads a certificate from disk and sets the #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert property + * with the raw certificate data if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB + * scheme, or with the path to the certificate file if using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_ca_cert(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, PROP_CA_CERT, value, NULL, scheme, out_format, error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the password used to access the CA certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->ca_cert_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert-password + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->ca_cert_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_subject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:subject-match property. This is the + * substring to be matched against the subject of the authentication + * server certificate, or %NULL no subject verification is to be + * performed. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_subject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->subject_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_altsubject_matches: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the number of entries in the + * #NMSetting8021x:altsubject-matches property of this setting. + * + * Returns: the number of altsubject-matches entries. + **/ +guint32 +nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_altsubject_matches(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), 0); + + return g_slist_length(NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->altsubject_matches); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSettingConnection + * @i: the zero-based index of the array of altSubjectName matches + * + * Returns the altSubjectName match at index @i. + * + * Returns: the altSubjectName match at index @i + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_return_val_if_fail(i <= g_slist_length(priv->altsubject_matches), NULL); + + return (const char *) g_slist_nth_data(priv->altsubject_matches, i); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_add_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @altsubject_match: the altSubjectName to allow for this connection + * + * Adds an allowed alternate subject name match. Until at least one + * match is added, the altSubjectName of the remote authentication + * server is not verified. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the alternative subject name match was + * successfully added, %FALSE if it was already allowed. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_add_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, const char *altsubject_match) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(altsubject_match != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->altsubject_matches; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(altsubject_match, (char *) iter->data)) + return FALSE; + } + + priv->altsubject_matches = g_slist_append(priv->altsubject_matches, g_strdup(altsubject_match)); + _notify(setting, PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); + return TRUE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @i: the index of the altSubjectName match to remove + * + * Removes the allowed altSubjectName at the specified index. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * elt; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + elt = g_slist_nth(priv->altsubject_matches, i); + g_return_if_fail(elt != NULL); + + g_free(elt->data); + priv->altsubject_matches = g_slist_delete_link(priv->altsubject_matches, elt); + _notify(setting, PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_altsubject_match_by_value: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @altsubject_match: the altSubjectName to remove + * + * Removes the allowed altSubjectName @altsubject_match. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the alternative subject name match was found and removed, + * %FALSE if it was not. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_altsubject_match_by_value(NMSetting8021x *setting, + const char * altsubject_match) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(altsubject_match != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->altsubject_matches; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(altsubject_match, (char *) iter->data)) { + priv->altsubject_matches = g_slist_delete_link(priv->altsubject_matches, iter); + _notify(setting, PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); + return TRUE; + } + } + return FALSE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_clear_altsubject_matches: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Clears all altSubjectName matches. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_clear_altsubject_matches(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_slist_free_full(priv->altsubject_matches, g_free); + priv->altsubject_matches = NULL; + _notify(setting, PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_domain_suffix_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:domain-suffix-match property. + * + * Since: 1.2 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_domain_suffix_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->domain_suffix_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_domain_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:domain-match property. + * + * Since: 1.24 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_domain_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->domain_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the client certificate. If the returned scheme + * is %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob(); + * if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(); + * if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, use nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the client certificate (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the client certificate data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: path to the client certificate file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the client certificate URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_client_cert: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH + * or %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the client + * certificate file (PEM, DER, or PKCS#<!-- -->12 format). The path must be UTF-8 + * encoded; use g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with + * any @scheme clears the client certificate. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the certificate + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the certificate added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Reads a certificate from disk and sets the #NMSetting8021x:client-cert + * property with the raw certificate data if using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme, or with the path to the certificate + * file if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_client_cert(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, PROP_CLIENT_CERT, value, NULL, scheme, out_format, error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the password used to access the client certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:client-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->client_cert_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:client-cert-password + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->client_cert_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_peapver: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the "phase 1" PEAP version to be used when authenticating with + * EAP-PEAP as contained in the #NMSetting8021x:phase1-peapver property. Valid + * values are %NULL (unset), "0" (PEAP version 0), and "1" (PEAP version 1). + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_peapver(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase1_peapver; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_peaplabel: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: whether the "phase 1" PEAP label is new-style or old-style, to be + * used when authenticating with EAP-PEAP, as contained in the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase1-peaplabel property. Valid values are %NULL (unset), + * "0" (use old-style label), and "1" (use new-style label). See the + * wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_peaplabel(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase1_peaplabel; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_fast_provisioning: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: whether "phase 1" PEAP fast provisioning should be used, as specified + * by the #NMSetting8021x:phase1-fast-provisioning property. See the + * wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_fast_provisioning(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase1_fast_provisioning; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_auth_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the authentication flags for "phase 1". + * + * Since: 1.8 + */ +NMSetting8021xAuthFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase1_auth_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), 0); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase1_auth_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_auth: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the "phase 2" non-EAP (ex MD5) allowed authentication method as + * specified by the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth property. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_auth(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_auth; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_autheap: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the "phase 2" EAP-based (ex TLS) allowed authentication method as + * specified by the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap property. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_autheap(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_autheap; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the path of the "phase 2" CA certificate directory if previously set. + * Systems will often have a directory that contains multiple individual CA + * certificates which the supplicant can then add to the verification chain. + * This may be used in addition to the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert property + * to add more CA certificates for verifying the network to client. + * + * Returns: the "phase 2" CA certificate directory path + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_ca_path; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the "phase 2" CA certificate. If the + * returned scheme is %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_blob(); if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, + * use nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_path(); if %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, + * use nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the "phase 2" CA certificate (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, phase2_ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the "phase 2" CA certificate blob if the CA certificate is stored + * using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme. Not all EAP methods use + * a CA certificate (LEAP for example), and those that can take advantage of the + * CA certificate allow it to be unset. Note that lack of a CA certificate + * reduces security by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks, because the identity + * of the network cannot be confirmed by the client. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the "phase 2" CA certificate data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, phase2_ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the "phase 2" CA certificate path if the CA certificate is stored + * using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. Not all EAP methods use + * a CA certificate (LEAP for example), and those that can take advantage of the + * CA certificate allow it to be unset. Note that lack of a CA certificate + * reduces security by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks, because the identity + * of the network cannot be confirmed by the client. + * + * Returns: path to the "phase 2" CA certificate file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, phase2_ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the "phase 2" CA certificate URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, phase2_ca_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_ca_cert: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH + * or %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the "phase2" CA + * certificate file (PEM or DER format). The path must be UTF-8 encoded; use + * g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with any @scheme + * clears the "phase2" CA certificate. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the certificate + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the certificate added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Reads a certificate from disk and sets the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert + * property with the raw certificate data if using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme, or with the path to the certificate + * file if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_ca_cert(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT, value, NULL, scheme, out_format, error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the password used to access the "phase2" CA certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_ca_cert_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_ca_cert_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_subject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-subject-match property. This is + * the substring to be matched against the subject of the "phase 2" + * authentication server certificate, or %NULL no subject verification + * is to be performed. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_subject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_subject_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_phase2_altsubject_matches: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the number of entries in the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-altsubject-matches property of this setting. + * + * Returns: the number of phase2-altsubject-matches entries. + **/ +guint32 +nm_setting_802_1x_get_num_phase2_altsubject_matches(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), 0); + + return g_slist_length(NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_altsubject_matches); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_domain_suffix_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-domain-suffix-match property. + * + * Since: 1.2 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_domain_suffix_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_domain_suffix_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_domain_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-domain-match property. + * + * Since: 1.24 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_domain_match(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_domain_match; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSettingConnection + * @i: the zero-based index of the array of "phase 2" altSubjectName matches + * + * Returns the "phase 2" altSubjectName match at index @i. + * + * Returns: the "phase 2" altSubjectName match at index @i + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_return_val_if_fail(i <= g_slist_length(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches), NULL); + + return (const char *) g_slist_nth_data(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, i); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_add_phase2_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @phase2_altsubject_match: the "phase 2" altSubjectName to allow for this + * connection + * + * Adds an allowed alternate subject name match for "phase 2". Until + * at least one match is added, the altSubjectName of the "phase 2" + * remote authentication server is not verified. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the "phase 2" alternative subject name match was + * successfully added, %FALSE if it was already allowed. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_add_phase2_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, + const char * phase2_altsubject_match) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(phase2_altsubject_match != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->phase2_altsubject_matches; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(phase2_altsubject_match, (char *) iter->data)) + return FALSE; + } + + priv->phase2_altsubject_matches = + g_slist_append(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, g_strdup(phase2_altsubject_match)); + _notify(setting, PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); + return TRUE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_phase2_altsubject_match: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @i: the index of the "phase 2" altSubjectName match to remove + * + * Removes the allowed "phase 2" altSubjectName at the specified index. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_phase2_altsubject_match(NMSetting8021x *setting, guint32 i) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * elt; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + elt = g_slist_nth(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, i); + g_return_if_fail(elt != NULL); + + g_free(elt->data); + priv->phase2_altsubject_matches = g_slist_delete_link(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, elt); + _notify(setting, PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_remove_phase2_altsubject_match_by_value: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @phase2_altsubject_match: the "phase 2" altSubjectName to remove + * + * Removes the allowed "phase 2" altSubjectName @phase2_altsubject_match. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the alternative subject name match for "phase 2" was found and removed, + * %FALSE if it was not. + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_remove_phase2_altsubject_match_by_value(NMSetting8021x *setting, + const char * phase2_altsubject_match) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + GSList * iter; + + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + g_return_val_if_fail(phase2_altsubject_match != NULL, FALSE); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + for (iter = priv->phase2_altsubject_matches; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + if (!strcmp(phase2_altsubject_match, (char *) iter->data)) { + priv->phase2_altsubject_matches = + g_slist_delete_link(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, iter); + _notify(setting, PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); + return TRUE; + } + } + return FALSE; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_clear_phase2_altsubject_matches: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Clears all "phase 2" altSubjectName matches. + **/ +void +nm_setting_802_1x_clear_phase2_altsubject_matches(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv; + + g_return_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting)); + + priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + g_slist_free_full(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, g_free); + priv->phase2_altsubject_matches = NULL; + _notify(setting, PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the "phase 2" client certificate. If the + * returned scheme is %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the "phase 2" client certificate (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, phase2_client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the "phase 2" client certificate data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, phase2_client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: path to the "phase 2" client certificate file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, phase2_client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the "phase 2" client certificate URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, phase2_client_cert); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_client_cert: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH + * or %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the "phase2" client + * certificate file (PEM, DER, or PKCS#<!-- -->12 format). The path must be UTF-8 + * encoded; use g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with + * any @scheme clears the "phase2" client certificate. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the certificate + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the certificate added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Reads a certificate from disk and sets the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert + * property with the raw certificate data if using the + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme, or with the path to the certificate + * file if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * Client certificates are used to identify the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_client_cert(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT, value, NULL, scheme, out_format, error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the password used to access the "phase2" client certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_client_cert_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert-password + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_client_cert_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the password used by the authentication method, if any, as specified + * by the #NMSetting8021x:password property + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the #NMSetting8021x:password + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_raw: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the password used by the authentication method as a + * UTF-8-encoded array of bytes, as specified by the + * #NMSetting8021x:password-raw property + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_raw(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->password_raw; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_raw_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:password-raw + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_password_raw_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->password_raw_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_pin: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the PIN used by the authentication method, if any, as specified + * by the #NMSetting8021x:pin property + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_pin(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->pin; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_pin_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:pin + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_pin_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->pin_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the private key. If the returned scheme is + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the private key (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * WARNING: the private key property is not a "secret" property, and thus + * unencrypted private key data may be readable by unprivileged users. Private + * keys should always be encrypted with a private key password. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the private key data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: path to the private key file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the private key URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_private_key: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH or + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the private key file + * (PEM, DER, or PKCS#<!-- -->12 format). The path must be UTF-8 encoded; use + * g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with any @scheme + * clears the private key. + * @password: password used to decrypt the private key, or %NULL if the password + * is unknown. If the password is given but fails to decrypt the private key, + * an error is returned. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the private key + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the private key added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * This function reads a private key from disk and sets the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key property with the private key file data if using + * the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme, or with the path to the private + * key file if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * If @password is given, this function attempts to decrypt the private key to + * verify that @password is correct, and if it is, updates the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key-password property with the given @password. If + * the decryption is unsuccessful, %FALSE is returned, @error is set, and no + * internal data is changed. If no @password is given, the private key is + * assumed to be valid, no decryption is performed, and the password may be set + * at a later time. + * + * WARNING: the private key property is not a "secret" property, and thus + * unencrypted private key data using the BLOB scheme may be readable by + * unprivileged users. Private keys should always be encrypted with a private + * key password to prevent unauthorized access to unencrypted private key data. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_private_key(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + const char * password, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, PROP_PRIVATE_KEY, value, password, scheme, out_format, error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the private key password used to decrypt the private key if + * previously set with nm_setting_802_1x_set_private_key(), or the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key-password property. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->private_key_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key-password + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->private_key_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_format: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the data format of the private key data stored in the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key property + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKFormat +nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_format(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + return _cert_impl_get_key_format(setting, private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_password: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the private key password used to decrypt the private key if + * previously set with nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_private_key() or the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password property. + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_password(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NULL); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_private_key_password; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_password_flags: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password + **/ +NMSettingSecretFlags +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_password_flags(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->phase2_private_key_password_flags; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_scheme: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the scheme used to store the "phase 2" private key. If the returned + * scheme is %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_blob(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_path(); if + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11, use + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_uri(). + * + * Returns: scheme used to store the "phase 2" private key (blob or path) + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKScheme +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_scheme(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_scheme(setting, phase2_private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_blob: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * WARNING: the phase2 private key property is not a "secret" property, and thus + * unencrypted private key data may be readable by unprivileged users. Private + * keys should always be encrypted with a private key password. + * + * Returns: (transfer none): the "phase 2" private key data + **/ +GBytes * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_blob(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_blob(setting, phase2_private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_path: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * Returns: path to the "phase 2" private key file + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_path(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_path(setting, phase2_private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_uri: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the "phase 2" private key URI analogously to + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_blob() and + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_path(). + * + * Currently, it's limited to PKCS#11 URIs ('pkcs11' scheme as defined by RFC + * 7512), but may be extended to other schemes in future (such as 'file' URIs + * for local files and 'data' URIs for inline certificate data). + * + * Returns: the URI string + * + * Since: 1.6 + **/ +const char * +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_uri(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + _cert_impl_get_uri(setting, phase2_private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_private_key: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * @value: when @scheme is set to either %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH or + * %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB, pass the path of the "phase2" private + * key file (PEM, DER, or PKCS#<!-- -->12 format). The path must be UTF-8 encoded; + * use g_filename_to_utf8() to convert if needed. Passing %NULL with any + * @scheme clears the private key. + * @password: password used to decrypt the private key, or %NULL if the password + * is unknown. If the password is given but fails to decrypt the private key, + * an error is returned. + * @scheme: desired storage scheme for the private key + * @out_format: on successful return, the type of the private key added + * @error: on unsuccessful return, an error + * + * Private keys are used to authenticate the connecting client to the network + * when EAP-TLS is used as either the "phase 1" or "phase 2" 802.1x + * authentication method. + * + * This function reads a private key from disk and sets the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key property with the private key file data if + * using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB scheme, or with the path to the + * private key file if using the %NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH scheme. + * + * If @password is given, this function attempts to decrypt the private key to + * verify that @password is correct, and if it is, updates the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password property with the given + * @password. If the decryption is unsuccessful, %FALSE is returned, @error is + * set, and no internal data is changed. If no @password is given, the private + * key is assumed to be valid, no decryption is performed, and the password may + * be set at a later time. + * + * WARNING: the "phase2" private key property is not a "secret" property, and + * thus unencrypted private key data using the BLOB scheme may be readable by + * unprivileged users. Private keys should always be encrypted with a private + * key password to prevent unauthorized access to unencrypted private key data. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the operation succeeded, %FALSE if it was unsuccessful + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_private_key(NMSetting8021x * setting, + const char * value, + const char * password, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + NMSetting8021xCKFormat *out_format, + GError ** error) +{ + return _cert_impl_set(setting, + PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY, + value, + password, + scheme, + out_format, + error); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_format: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns: the data format of the "phase 2" private key data stored in the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key property + **/ +NMSetting8021xCKFormat +nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_format(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + return _cert_impl_get_key_format(setting, phase2_private_key); +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_auth_timeout: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the value contained in the #NMSetting8021x:auth-timeout property. + * + * Returns: the configured authentication timeout in seconds. Zero means the + * global default value. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ +int +nm_setting_802_1x_get_auth_timeout(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), 0); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->auth_timeout; +} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_get_optional: + * @setting: the #NMSetting8021x + * + * Returns the value contained in the #NMSetting8021x:optional property. + * + * Returns: %TRUE if the activation should proceed even when the 802.1X + * authentication fails; %FALSE otherwise + * + * Since: 1.22 + **/ +gboolean +nm_setting_802_1x_get_optional(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X(setting), FALSE); + + return NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->optional; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +static void +need_secrets_password(NMSetting8021x *self, GPtrArray *secrets, gboolean phase2) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + if ((!priv->password || !strlen(priv->password)) + && (!priv->password_raw || !g_bytes_get_size(priv->password_raw))) { + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD); + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD_RAW); + } +} + +static void +need_secrets_sim(NMSetting8021x *self, GPtrArray *secrets, gboolean phase2) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + if (!priv->pin || !strlen(priv->pin)) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PIN); +} + +static gboolean +need_private_key_password(GBytes * blob, + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme, + const char * path, + const char * password, + NMSettingSecretFlags flags) +{ + NMCryptoFileFormat format = NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN; + + if (flags & NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED) + return FALSE; + + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 && flags == NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE) + return FALSE; + + /* Private key password is required */ + if (password) { + if (path) + format = nm_crypto_verify_private_key(path, password, NULL, NULL); + else if (blob) + format = nm_crypto_verify_private_key_data(g_bytes_get_data(blob, NULL), + g_bytes_get_size(blob), + password, + NULL, + NULL); + else + return FALSE; + } + + return (format == NM_CRYPTO_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN); +} + +static void +need_secrets_tls(NMSetting8021x *self, GPtrArray *secrets, gboolean phase2) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + NMSetting8021xCKScheme scheme; + GBytes * blob = NULL; + const char * path = NULL; + + if (phase2) { + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH) + path = nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_path(self); + else if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB) + blob = nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_private_key_blob(self); + else if (scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11) + g_warning("%s: unknown phase2 private key scheme %d", __func__, scheme); + + if (need_private_key_password(blob, + scheme, + path, + priv->phase2_private_key_password, + priv->phase2_private_key_password_flags)) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD); + + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_ca_cert_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && !(priv->phase2_ca_cert_password_flags == NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE + || priv->phase2_ca_cert_password_flags & NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED) + && !priv->phase2_ca_cert_password) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD); + + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_phase2_client_cert_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && !(priv->phase2_client_cert_password_flags & NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED + || priv->phase2_client_cert_password_flags == NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE) + && !priv->phase2_client_cert_password) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD); + } else { + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PATH) + path = nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_path(self); + else if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_BLOB) + blob = nm_setting_802_1x_get_private_key_blob(self); + else if (scheme != NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11) + g_warning("%s: unknown private key scheme %d", __func__, scheme); + + if (need_private_key_password(blob, + scheme, + path, + priv->private_key_password, + priv->private_key_password_flags)) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD); + + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_ca_cert_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && !(priv->ca_cert_password_flags & NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED + || priv->ca_cert_password_flags == NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE) + && !priv->ca_cert_password) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT_PASSWORD); + + scheme = nm_setting_802_1x_get_client_cert_scheme(self); + if (scheme == NM_SETTING_802_1X_CK_SCHEME_PKCS11 + && !(priv->client_cert_password_flags == NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE + || priv->client_cert_password_flags & NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED) + && !priv->client_cert_password) + g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD); + } +} + +static gboolean +verify_tls(NMSetting8021x *self, gboolean phase2, GError **error) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + if (phase2) { + if (!priv->phase2_client_cert) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } else if (!g_bytes_get_size(priv->phase2_client_cert)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } + + /* Private key is required for TLS */ + if (!priv->phase2_private_key) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY); + return FALSE; + } else if (!g_bytes_get_size(priv->phase2_private_key)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY); + return FALSE; + } + + /* If the private key is PKCS#12, check that it matches the client cert */ + if (nm_crypto_is_pkcs12_data(g_bytes_get_data(priv->phase2_private_key, NULL), + g_bytes_get_size(priv->phase2_private_key), + NULL)) { + if (!g_bytes_equal(priv->phase2_private_key, priv->phase2_client_cert)) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("has to match '%s' property for PKCS#12"), + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } + } + } else { + if (!priv->client_cert) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } else if (!g_bytes_get_size(priv->client_cert)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } + + /* Private key is required for TLS */ + if (!priv->private_key) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY); + return FALSE; + } else if (!g_bytes_get_size(priv->private_key)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY); + return FALSE; + } + + /* If the private key is PKCS#12, check that it matches the client cert */ + if (nm_crypto_is_pkcs12_data(g_bytes_get_data(priv->private_key, NULL), + g_bytes_get_size(priv->private_key), + NULL)) { + if (!g_bytes_equal(priv->private_key, priv->client_cert)) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("has to match '%s' property for PKCS#12"), + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT); + return FALSE; + } + } + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static gboolean +verify_ttls(NMSetting8021x *self, gboolean phase2, GError **error) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + if (!priv->identity || !strlen(priv->identity)) { + if (!priv->identity) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + } else { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + } + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_IDENTITY); + return FALSE; + } + + if ((!priv->phase2_auth && !priv->phase2_autheap) + || (priv->phase2_auth && priv->phase2_autheap)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("exactly one property must be set")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s, %s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTH, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTHEAP); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static gboolean +verify_identity(NMSetting8021x *self, gboolean phase2, GError **error) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + if (!priv->identity) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_IDENTITY); + return FALSE; + } else if (!strlen(priv->identity)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is empty")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_IDENTITY); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static void +need_secrets_phase2(NMSetting8021x *self, GPtrArray *secrets, gboolean phase2) +{ + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + char * method = NULL; + int i; + + g_return_if_fail(phase2 == FALSE); + + /* Check phase2_auth and phase2_autheap */ + method = priv->phase2_auth; + if (!method && priv->phase2_autheap) + method = priv->phase2_autheap; + + if (!method) { + g_warning("Couldn't find EAP method."); + g_assert_not_reached(); + return; + } + + /* Ask the configured phase2 method if it needs secrets */ + for (i = 0; eap_methods_table[i].method; i++) { + if (eap_methods_table[i].ns_func == NULL) + continue; + if (!strcmp(eap_methods_table[i].method, method)) { + (*eap_methods_table[i].ns_func)(self, secrets, TRUE); + break; + } + } +} + +static const EAPMethodsTable eap_methods_table[] = { + {"leap", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"pwd", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"md5", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"pap", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"chap", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"mschap", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"mschapv2", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"fast", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"tls", need_secrets_tls, verify_tls}, + {"peap", need_secrets_phase2, verify_ttls}, + {"ttls", need_secrets_phase2, verify_ttls}, + {"sim", need_secrets_sim, NULL}, + {"gtc", need_secrets_password, verify_identity}, + {"otp", NULL, NULL}, // FIXME: implement + {"external", NULL, NULL}, + {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; + +static gboolean +verify(NMSetting *setting, NMConnection *connection, GError **error) +{ + NMSetting8021x * self = NM_SETTING_802_1X(setting); + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + const char * valid_eap[] = + {"leap", "md5", "tls", "peap", "ttls", "sim", "fast", "pwd", "external", NULL}; + GSList *iter; + + if (error) + g_return_val_if_fail(*error == NULL, FALSE); + + if (connection && priv->optional + && !nm_streq0(nm_connection_get_connection_type(connection), + NM_SETTING_WIRED_SETTING_NAME)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("can be enabled only on Ethernet connections")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_OPTIONAL); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!priv->eap) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY, + _("property is missing")); + g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_802_1X_EAP); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!_nm_utils_string_slist_validate(priv->eap, valid_eap)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("property is invalid")); + g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_802_1X_EAP); + return FALSE; + } + + /* Ask each configured EAP method if its valid */ + for (iter = priv->eap; iter; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + const char *method = (const char *) iter->data; + int i; + + for (i = 0; eap_methods_table[i].method; i++) { + if (eap_methods_table[i].v_func == NULL) + continue; + if (!strcmp(eap_methods_table[i].method, method)) { + if (!(*eap_methods_table[i].v_func) (self, FALSE, error)) + return FALSE; + break; + } + } + } + + if (!NM_IN_STRSET(priv->phase1_peapver, NULL, "0", "1")) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("'%s' is not a valid value for the property"), + priv->phase1_peapver); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_PEAPVER); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!NM_IN_STRSET(priv->phase1_peaplabel, NULL, "0", "1")) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("'%s' is not a valid value for the property"), + priv->phase1_peaplabel); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!NM_IN_STRSET(priv->phase1_fast_provisioning, NULL, "0", "1", "2", "3")) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("'%s' is not a valid value for the property"), + priv->phase1_fast_provisioning); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING); + return FALSE; + } + + if (NM_FLAGS_ANY(priv->phase1_auth_flags, ~NM_SETTING_802_1X_AUTH_FLAGS_ALL)) { + g_set_error_literal(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("invalid auth flags")); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!NM_IN_STRSET(priv->phase2_auth, + NULL, + "pap", + "chap", + "mschap", + "mschapv2", + "gtc", + "otp", + "md5", + "tls")) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("'%s' is not a valid value for the property"), + priv->phase2_auth); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTH); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!NM_IN_STRSET(priv->phase2_autheap, NULL, "md5", "mschapv2", "otp", "gtc", "tls")) { + g_set_error(error, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR, + NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY, + _("'%s' is not a valid value for the property"), + priv->phase2_autheap); + g_prefix_error(error, + "%s.%s: ", + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTHEAP); + return FALSE; + } + + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->ca_cert, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT, + priv->ca_cert_password, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + error)) + return FALSE; + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->phase2_ca_cert, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT, + priv->phase2_ca_cert_password, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + error)) + return FALSE; + + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->client_cert, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT, + priv->client_cert_password, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + error)) + return FALSE; + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->phase2_client_cert, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT, + priv->phase2_client_cert_password, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + error)) + return FALSE; + + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->private_key, NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY, NULL, NULL, error)) + return FALSE; + if (!_cert_verify_property(priv->phase2_private_key, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY, + NULL, + NULL, + error)) + return FALSE; + + return TRUE; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +static GPtrArray * +need_secrets(NMSetting *setting) +{ + NMSetting8021x * self = NM_SETTING_802_1X(setting); + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + GSList * iter; + GPtrArray * secrets; + gboolean eap_method_found = FALSE; + + secrets = g_ptr_array_sized_new(4); + + /* Ask each configured EAP method if it needs secrets */ + for (iter = priv->eap; iter && !eap_method_found; iter = g_slist_next(iter)) { + const char *method = (const char *) iter->data; + int i; + + for (i = 0; eap_methods_table[i].method; i++) { + if (eap_methods_table[i].ns_func == NULL) + continue; + if (!strcmp(eap_methods_table[i].method, method)) { + (*eap_methods_table[i].ns_func)(self, secrets, FALSE); + + /* Only break out of the outer loop if this EAP method + * needed secrets. + */ + if (secrets->len > 0) + eap_method_found = TRUE; + break; + } + } + } + + if (secrets->len == 0) { + g_ptr_array_free(secrets, TRUE); + return NULL; + } + + return secrets; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +static void +get_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec) +{ + NMSetting8021x * setting = NM_SETTING_802_1X(object); + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + + switch (prop_id) { + case PROP_EAP: + g_value_take_boxed(value, _nm_utils_slist_to_strv(priv->eap, TRUE)); + break; + case PROP_IDENTITY: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->identity); + break; + case PROP_ANONYMOUS_IDENTITY: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->anonymous_identity); + break; + case PROP_PAC_FILE: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->pac_file); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->ca_cert); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->ca_cert_password); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->ca_cert_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_CA_PATH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->ca_path); + break; + case PROP_SUBJECT_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->subject_match); + break; + case PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES: + g_value_take_boxed(value, _nm_utils_slist_to_strv(priv->altsubject_matches, TRUE)); + break; + case PROP_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->domain_suffix_match); + break; + case PROP_DOMAIN_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->domain_match); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->client_cert); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->client_cert_password); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->client_cert_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_PEAPVER: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase1_peapver); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase1_peaplabel); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase1_fast_provisioning); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS: + g_value_set_uint(value, priv->phase1_auth_flags); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_AUTH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_auth); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_AUTHEAP: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_autheap); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->phase2_ca_cert); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_ca_cert_password); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->phase2_ca_cert_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_PATH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_ca_path); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_subject_match); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES: + g_value_take_boxed(value, _nm_utils_slist_to_strv(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, TRUE)); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_domain_suffix_match); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_domain_match); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->phase2_client_cert); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_client_cert_password); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->phase2_client_cert_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->password); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_RAW: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->password_raw); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->password_raw_flags); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->private_key); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->private_key_password); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->private_key_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY: + g_value_set_boxed(value, priv->phase2_private_key); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->phase2_private_key_password); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->phase2_private_key_password_flags); + break; + case PROP_PIN: + g_value_set_string(value, priv->pin); + break; + case PROP_PIN_FLAGS: + g_value_set_flags(value, priv->pin_flags); + break; + case PROP_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS: + g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->system_ca_certs); + break; + case PROP_AUTH_TIMEOUT: + g_value_set_int(value, priv->auth_timeout); + break; + case PROP_OPTIONAL: + g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->optional); + break; + default: + G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec); + break; + } +} + +static void +set_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, const GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec) +{ + NMSetting8021x * setting = NM_SETTING_802_1X(object); + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(setting); + + switch (prop_id) { + case PROP_EAP: + g_slist_free_full(priv->eap, g_free); + priv->eap = _nm_utils_strv_to_slist(g_value_get_boxed(value), TRUE); + break; + case PROP_IDENTITY: + g_free(priv->identity); + priv->identity = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_ANONYMOUS_IDENTITY: + g_free(priv->anonymous_identity); + priv->anonymous_identity = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PAC_FILE: + g_free(priv->pac_file); + priv->pac_file = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT: + g_bytes_unref(priv->ca_cert); + priv->ca_cert = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_free(priv->ca_cert_password); + priv->ca_cert_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->ca_cert_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_CA_PATH: + g_free(priv->ca_path); + priv->ca_path = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_SUBJECT_MATCH: + g_free(priv->subject_match); + priv->subject_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES: + g_slist_free_full(priv->altsubject_matches, g_free); + priv->altsubject_matches = _nm_utils_strv_to_slist(g_value_get_boxed(value), TRUE); + break; + case PROP_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH: + g_free(priv->domain_suffix_match); + priv->domain_suffix_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_DOMAIN_MATCH: + g_free(priv->domain_match); + priv->domain_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT: + g_bytes_unref(priv->client_cert); + priv->client_cert = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_free(priv->client_cert_password); + priv->client_cert_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->client_cert_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_PEAPVER: + g_free(priv->phase1_peapver); + priv->phase1_peapver = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL: + g_free(priv->phase1_peaplabel); + priv->phase1_peaplabel = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING: + g_free(priv->phase1_fast_provisioning); + priv->phase1_fast_provisioning = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS: + priv->phase1_auth_flags = g_value_get_uint(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_AUTH: + g_free(priv->phase2_auth); + priv->phase2_auth = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_AUTHEAP: + g_free(priv->phase2_autheap); + priv->phase2_autheap = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT: + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_ca_cert); + priv->phase2_ca_cert = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_free(priv->phase2_ca_cert_password); + priv->phase2_ca_cert_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->phase2_ca_cert_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CA_PATH: + g_free(priv->phase2_ca_path); + priv->phase2_ca_path = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH: + g_free(priv->phase2_subject_match); + priv->phase2_subject_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES: + g_slist_free_full(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, g_free); + priv->phase2_altsubject_matches = _nm_utils_strv_to_slist(g_value_get_boxed(value), TRUE); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH: + g_free(priv->phase2_domain_suffix_match); + priv->phase2_domain_suffix_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH: + g_free(priv->phase2_domain_match); + priv->phase2_domain_match = nm_strdup_not_empty(g_value_get_string(value)); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT: + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_client_cert); + priv->phase2_client_cert = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD: + g_free(priv->phase2_client_cert_password); + priv->phase2_client_cert_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->phase2_client_cert_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD: + g_free(priv->password); + priv->password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_RAW: + g_bytes_unref(priv->password_raw); + priv->password_raw = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS: + priv->password_raw_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY: + g_bytes_unref(priv->private_key); + priv->private_key = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: + nm_free_secret(priv->private_key_password); + priv->private_key_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->private_key_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY: + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_private_key); + priv->phase2_private_key = g_value_dup_boxed(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: + nm_free_secret(priv->phase2_private_key_password); + priv->phase2_private_key_password = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS: + priv->phase2_private_key_password_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_PIN: + g_free(priv->pin); + priv->pin = g_value_dup_string(value); + break; + case PROP_PIN_FLAGS: + priv->pin_flags = g_value_get_flags(value); + break; + case PROP_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS: + priv->system_ca_certs = g_value_get_boolean(value); + break; + case PROP_AUTH_TIMEOUT: + priv->auth_timeout = g_value_get_int(value); + break; + case PROP_OPTIONAL: + priv->optional = g_value_get_boolean(value); + break; + default: + G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec); + break; + } +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ + +static void +nm_setting_802_1x_init(NMSetting8021x *setting) +{} + +/** + * nm_setting_802_1x_new: + * + * Creates a new #NMSetting8021x object with default values. + * + * Returns: the new empty #NMSetting8021x object + **/ +NMSetting * +nm_setting_802_1x_new(void) +{ + return g_object_new(NM_TYPE_SETTING_802_1X, NULL); +} + +static void +finalize(GObject *object) +{ + NMSetting8021x * self = NM_SETTING_802_1X(object); + NMSetting8021xPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_802_1X_GET_PRIVATE(self); + + g_free(priv->identity); + g_free(priv->anonymous_identity); + g_free(priv->ca_path); + g_free(priv->subject_match); + g_free(priv->domain_suffix_match); + g_free(priv->phase1_peapver); + g_free(priv->phase1_peaplabel); + g_free(priv->phase1_fast_provisioning); + g_free(priv->phase2_auth); + g_free(priv->phase2_autheap); + g_free(priv->phase2_ca_path); + g_free(priv->phase2_subject_match); + g_free(priv->phase2_domain_suffix_match); + g_free(priv->password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->password_raw); + g_free(priv->pin); + + g_slist_free_full(priv->eap, g_free); + g_slist_free_full(priv->altsubject_matches, g_free); + g_slist_free_full(priv->phase2_altsubject_matches, g_free); + + g_bytes_unref(priv->ca_cert); + g_free(priv->ca_cert_password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->client_cert); + g_free(priv->client_cert_password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->private_key); + nm_free_secret(priv->private_key_password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_ca_cert); + g_free(priv->phase2_ca_cert_password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_client_cert); + g_free(priv->phase2_client_cert_password); + g_bytes_unref(priv->phase2_private_key); + nm_free_secret(priv->phase2_private_key_password); + + G_OBJECT_CLASS(nm_setting_802_1x_parent_class)->finalize(object); +} + +static void +nm_setting_802_1x_class_init(NMSetting8021xClass *klass) +{ + GObjectClass * object_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS(klass); + NMSettingClass *setting_class = NM_SETTING_CLASS(klass); + GArray * properties_override = _nm_sett_info_property_override_create_array(); + + g_type_class_add_private(klass, sizeof(NMSetting8021xPrivate)); + + object_class->get_property = get_property; + object_class->set_property = set_property; + object_class->finalize = finalize; + + setting_class->verify = verify; + setting_class->need_secrets = need_secrets; + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:eap: + * + * The allowed EAP method to be used when authenticating to the network with + * 802.1x. Valid methods are: "leap", "md5", "tls", "peap", "ttls", "pwd", + * and "fast". Each method requires different configuration using the + * properties of this setting; refer to wpa_supplicant documentation for the + * allowed combinations. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: eap + * variable: IEEE_8021X_EAP_METHODS(+) + * values: "LEAP", "PWD", "TLS", "PEAP", "TTLS", "FAST" + * description: EAP method for 802.1X authentication. + * example: IEEE_8021X_EAP_METHODS=PEAP + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_EAP] = g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_EAP, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_STRV, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:identity: + * + * Identity string for EAP authentication methods. Often the user's user or + * login name. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: identity + * variable: IEEE_8021X_IDENTITY(+) + * description: Identity for EAP authentication methods. + * example: IEEE_8021X_IDENTITY=itsme + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_IDENTITY] = g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_IDENTITY, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:anonymous-identity: + * + * Anonymous identity string for EAP authentication methods. Used as the + * unencrypted identity with EAP types that support different tunneled + * identity like EAP-TTLS. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: anonymous-identity + * variable: IEEE_8021X_ANON_IDENTITY(+) + * description: Anonymous identity for EAP authentication methods. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_ANONYMOUS_IDENTITY] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_ANONYMOUS_IDENTITY, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:pac-file: + * + * UTF-8 encoded file path containing PAC for EAP-FAST. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: pac-file + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PAC_FILE(+) + * description: File with PAC (Protected Access Credential) for EAP-FAST. + * example: IEEE_8021X_PAC_FILE=/home/joe/my-fast.pac + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PAC_FILE] = g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PAC_FILE, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:ca-cert: + * + * Contains the CA certificate if used by the EAP method specified in the + * #NMSetting8021x:eap property. + * + * Certificate data is specified using a "scheme"; three are currently + * supported: blob, path and pkcs#11 URL. When using the blob scheme this property + * should be set to the certificate's DER encoded data. When using the path + * scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the + * certificate, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating + * NUL byte. + * This property can be unset even if the EAP method supports CA certificates, + * but this allows man-in-the-middle attacks and is NOT recommended. + * + * Note that enabling NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs will override this + * setting to use the built-in path, if the built-in path is not a directory. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_ca_cert() function instead. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: ca-cert + * variable: IEEE_8021X_CA_CERT(+) + * description: CA certificate for EAP. + * example: IEEE_8021X_CA_CERT=/home/joe/cacert.crt + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CA_CERT] = g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:ca-cert-password: + * + * The password used to access the CA certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:ca-cert-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert-password property. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:ca-path: + * + * UTF-8 encoded path to a directory containing PEM or DER formatted + * certificates to be added to the verification chain in addition to the + * certificate specified in the #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert property. + * + * If NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs is enabled and the built-in CA + * path is an existing directory, then this setting is ignored. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: ca-path + * variable: IEEE_8021X_CA_PATH(+) + * description: The search path for the certificate. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CA_PATH] = g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CA_PATH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:subject-match: + * + * Substring to be matched against the subject of the certificate presented + * by the authentication server. When unset, no verification of the + * authentication server certificate's subject is performed. This property + * provides little security, if any, and its use is deprecated in favor of + * NMSetting8021x:domain-suffix-match. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: subject-match + * variable: IEEE_8021X_SUBJECT_MATCH(+) + * description: Substring to match subject of server certificate against. + * example: IEEE_8021X_SUBJECT_MATCH="Red Hat" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_SUBJECT_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_SUBJECT_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:altsubject-matches: + * + * List of strings to be matched against the altSubjectName of the + * certificate presented by the authentication server. If the list is empty, + * no verification of the server certificate's altSubjectName is performed. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: altsubject-matches + * variable: IEEE_8021X_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES(+) + * description: List of strings to be matched against the altSubjectName. + * example: IEEE_8021X_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES="s1.domain.cc" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_STRV, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:domain-suffix-match: + * + * Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is used as a suffix + * match requirement for dNSName element(s) of the certificate presented by + * the authentication server. If a matching dNSName is found, this + * constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present, this constraint is + * matched against SubjectName CN using same suffix match comparison. + * Since version 1.24, multiple valid FQDNs can be passed as a ";" delimited + * list. + * + * Since: 1.2 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: domain-suffix-match + * description: Suffix to match domain of server certificate against. + * variable: IEEE_8021X_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH(+) + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:domain-match: + * + * Constraint for server domain name. If set, this list of FQDNs is used as + * a match requirement for dNSName element(s) of the certificate presented + * by the authentication server. If a matching dNSName is found, this + * constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present, this constraint is + * matched against SubjectName CN using the same comparison. + * Multiple valid FQDNs can be passed as a ";" delimited list. + * + * Since: 1.24 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: domain-match + * description: Value to match domain of server certificate against. + * variable: IEEE_8021X_DOMAIN_MATCH(+) + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_DOMAIN_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_DOMAIN_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:client-cert: + * + * Contains the client certificate if used by the EAP method specified in + * the #NMSetting8021x:eap property. + * + * Certificate data is specified using a "scheme"; two are currently + * supported: blob and path. When using the blob scheme (which is backwards + * compatible with NM 0.7.x) this property should be set to the + * certificate's DER encoded data. When using the path scheme, this property + * should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the certificate, prefixed + * with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating NUL byte. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_client_cert() function instead. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: client-cert + * variable: IEEE_8021X_CLIENT_CERT(+) + * description: Client certificate for EAP. + * example: IEEE_8021X_CLIENT_CERT=/home/joe/mycert.crt + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CLIENT_CERT] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:client-cert-password: + * + * The password used to access the client certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:client-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:client-cert-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:client-cert-password property. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase1-peapver: + * + * Forces which PEAP version is used when PEAP is set as the EAP method in + * the #NMSetting8021x:eap property. When unset, the version reported by + * the server will be used. Sometimes when using older RADIUS servers, it + * is necessary to force the client to use a particular PEAP version. To do + * so, this property may be set to "0" or "1" to force that specific PEAP + * version. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase1-peapver + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PEAP_VERSION(+) + * values: 0, 1 + * description: Use to force a specific PEAP version. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE1_PEAPVER] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_PEAPVER, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase1-peaplabel: + * + * Forces use of the new PEAP label during key derivation. Some RADIUS + * servers may require forcing the new PEAP label to interoperate with + * PEAPv1. Set to "1" to force use of the new PEAP label. See the + * wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase1-peaplabel + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PEAP_FORCE_NEW_LABEL(+) + * values: yes, no + * default: no + * description: Use to force the new PEAP label during key derivation. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_PEAPLABEL, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase1-fast-provisioning: + * + * Enables or disables in-line provisioning of EAP-FAST credentials when + * FAST is specified as the EAP method in the #NMSetting8021x:eap property. + * Recognized values are "0" (disabled), "1" (allow unauthenticated + * provisioning), "2" (allow authenticated provisioning), and "3" (allow + * both authenticated and unauthenticated provisioning). See the + * wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase1-fast-provisioning + * variable: IEEE_8021X_FAST_PROVISIONING(+) + * values: space-separated list of these values [allow-auth, allow-unauth] + * description: Enable in-line provisioning of EAP-FAST credentials. + * example: IEEE_8021X_FAST_PROVISIONING="allow-auth allow-unauth" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_FAST_PROVISIONING, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase1-auth-flags: + * + * Specifies authentication flags to use in "phase 1" outer + * authentication using #NMSetting8021xAuthFlags options. + * The individual TLS versions can be explicitly disabled. If a certain + * TLS disable flag is not set, it is up to the supplicant to allow + * or forbid it. The TLS options map to tls_disable_tlsv1_x settings. + * See the wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + * + * Since: 1.8 + */ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase1-auth-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS(+) + * values: space-separated list of authentication flags names + * description: Authentication flags for the supplicant + * example: IEEE_8021X_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS="tls-1-0-disable tls-1-1-disable" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_uint(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE1_AUTH_FLAGS, + "", + "", + 0, + G_MAXUINT32, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_AUTH_FLAGS_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth: + * + * Specifies the allowed "phase 2" inner authentication method when an EAP + * method that uses an inner TLS tunnel is specified in the #NMSetting8021x:eap + * property. For TTLS this property selects one of the supported non-EAP + * inner methods: "pap", "chap", "mschap", "mschapv2" while + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap selects an EAP inner method. For PEAP + * this selects an inner EAP method, one of: "gtc", "otp", "md5" and "tls". + * Each "phase 2" inner method requires specific parameters for successful + * authentication; see the wpa_supplicant documentation for more details. + * Both #NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth and #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap cannot + * be specified. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-auth + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS(+) + * values: "PAP", "CHAP", "MSCHAP", "MSCHAPV2", "GTC", "OTP", "MD5" and "TLS" + * description: Inner non-EAP authentication methods for TTLS or the inner EAP + * authentication method for PEAP. IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS can contain + * values both for 'phase2-auth' and 'phase2-autheap' properties. + * example: IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS=PAP + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_AUTH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap: + * + * Specifies the allowed "phase 2" inner EAP-based authentication method + * when TTLS is specified in the #NMSetting8021x:eap property. Recognized + * EAP-based "phase 2" methods are "md5", "mschapv2", "otp", "gtc", and + * "tls". Each "phase 2" inner method requires specific parameters for + * successful authentication; see the wpa_supplicant documentation for + * more details. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-autheap + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS(+) + * values: "EAP-MD5", "EAP-MSCHAPV2", "EAP-GTC", "EAP-OTP" and "EAP-TLS" + * description: Inner EAP-based authentication methods. Note that + * IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS is also used for 'phase2-auth' values. + * example: IEEE_8021X_INNER_AUTH_METHODS="MSCHAPV2 EAP-TLS" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_AUTHEAP] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_AUTHEAP, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert: + * + * Contains the "phase 2" CA certificate if used by the EAP method specified + * in the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth or #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap + * properties. + * + * Certificate data is specified using a "scheme"; three are currently + * supported: blob, path and pkcs#11 URL. When using the blob scheme this property + * should be set to the certificate's DER encoded data. When using the path + * scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the + * certificate, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating + * NUL byte. + * This property can be unset even if the EAP method supports CA certificates, + * but this allows man-in-the-middle attacks and is NOT recommended. + * + * Note that enabling NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs will override this + * setting to use the built-in path, if the built-in path is not a directory. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_ca_cert() function instead. + **/ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert-password: + * + * The password used to access the "phase2" CA certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert-password property. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-path: + * + * UTF-8 encoded path to a directory containing PEM or DER formatted + * certificates to be added to the verification chain in addition to the + * certificate specified in the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert property. + * + * If NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs is enabled and the built-in CA + * path is an existing directory, then this setting is ignored. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-ca-path + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_CA_PATH(+) + * description: The search path for the certificate. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CA_PATH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CA_PATH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-subject-match: + * + * Substring to be matched against the subject of the certificate presented + * by the authentication server during the inner "phase 2" + * authentication. When unset, no verification of the authentication server + * certificate's subject is performed. This property provides little security, + * if any, and its use is deprecated in favor of + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-domain-suffix-match. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-subject-match + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH(+) + * description: Substring to match subject of server certificate against. + * example: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH="Red Hat" + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_SUBJECT_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-altsubject-matches: + * + * List of strings to be matched against the altSubjectName of the + * certificate presented by the authentication server during the inner + * "phase 2" authentication. If the list is empty, no verification of the + * server certificate's altSubjectName is performed. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-altsubject-matches + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES(+) + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_ALTSUBJECT_MATCHES, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_STRV, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-domain-suffix-match: + * + * Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is used as a suffix + * match requirement for dNSName element(s) of the certificate presented by + * the authentication server during the inner "phase 2" authentication. If + * a matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName + * values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN + * using same suffix match comparison. + * Since version 1.24, multiple valid FQDNs can be passed as a ";" delimited + * list. + * + * Since: 1.2 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-domain-suffix-match + * description: Suffix to match domain of server certificate for phase 2 against. + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH(+) + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-domain-match: + * + * Constraint for server domain name. If set, this list of FQDNs is used as + * a match requirement for dNSName element(s) of the certificate presented + * by the authentication server during the inner "phase 2" authentication. + * If a matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName + * values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN + * using the same comparison. + * Multiple valid FQDNs can be passed as a ";" delimited list. + * + * Since: 1.24 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-domain-match + * description: Value to match domain of server certificate for phase 2 against. + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH(+) + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_DOMAIN_MATCH, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert: + * + * Contains the "phase 2" client certificate if used by the EAP method + * specified in the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth or + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap properties. + * + * Certificate data is specified using a "scheme"; two are currently + * supported: blob and path. When using the blob scheme (which is backwards + * compatible with NM 0.7.x) this property should be set to the + * certificate's DER encoded data. When using the path scheme, this property + * should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the certificate, prefixed + * with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating NUL byte. This + * property can be unset even if the EAP method supports CA certificates, + * but this allows man-in-the-middle attacks and is NOT recommended. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_client_cert() function instead. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-client-cert + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_CLIENT_CERT(+) + * description: Client certificate for inner EAP method. + * example: IEEE_8021X_INNER_CLIENT_CERT=/home/joe/mycert.crt + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert-password: + * + * The password used to access the "phase2" client certificate stored in + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert property. Only makes sense if the certificate + * is stored on a PKCS#<!-- -->11 token that requires a login. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-client-cert-password property. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_CLIENT_CERT_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:password: + * + * UTF-8 encoded password used for EAP authentication methods. If both the + * #NMSetting8021x:password property and the #NMSetting8021x:password-raw + * property are specified, #NMSetting8021x:password is preferred. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: password + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD(+) + * description: UTF-8 encoded password used for EAP. It can also go to "key-" + * lookaside file, or it can be owned by a secret agent. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:password property. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: password-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD_FLAGS(+) + * format: NMSettingSecretFlags + * description: Password flags for IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD password. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:password-raw: + * + * Password used for EAP authentication methods, given as a byte array to + * allow passwords in other encodings than UTF-8 to be used. If both the + * #NMSetting8021x:password property and the #NMSetting8021x:password-raw + * property are specified, #NMSetting8021x:password is preferred. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: password-raw + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD_RAW(+) + * description: password used for EAP, encoded as a hexadecimal string. It + * can also go to "key-" lookaside file. + * example: IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD_RAW=041c8320083aa4bf + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PASSWORD_RAW] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD_RAW, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:password-raw-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:password-raw property. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: password-raw-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS(+) + * description: The secret flags for password-raw. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PASSWORD_RAW_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:private-key: + * + * Contains the private key when the #NMSetting8021x:eap property is set to + * "tls". + * + * Key data is specified using a "scheme"; two are currently supported: blob + * and path. When using the blob scheme and private keys, this property + * should be set to the key's encrypted PEM encoded data. When using private + * keys with the path scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 + * encoded path of the key, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending + * with a terminating NUL byte. When using PKCS#<!-- -->12 format private + * keys and the blob scheme, this property should be set to the + * PKCS#<!-- -->12 data and the #NMSetting8021x:private-key-password + * property must be set to password used to decrypt the PKCS#<!-- -->12 + * certificate and key. When using PKCS#<!-- -->12 files and the path + * scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the + * key, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating + * NUL byte, and as with the blob scheme the "private-key-password" property + * must be set to the password used to decode the PKCS#<!-- -->12 private + * key and certificate. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_private_key() function instead. + * + * WARNING: #NMSetting8021x:private-key is not a "secret" property, and thus + * unencrypted private key data using the BLOB scheme may be readable by + * unprivileged users. Private keys should always be encrypted with a + * private key password to prevent unauthorized access to unencrypted + * private key data. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: private-key + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY(+) + * description: Private key for EAP-TLS. + * example: IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY=/home/joe/mykey.p12 + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PRIVATE_KEY] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:private-key-password: + * + * The password used to decrypt the private key specified in the + * #NMSetting8021x:private-key property when the private key either uses the + * path scheme, or if the private key is a PKCS#<!-- -->12 format key. Setting this + * property directly is not generally necessary except when returning + * secrets to NetworkManager; it is generally set automatically when setting + * the private key by the nm_setting_802_1x_set_private_key() function. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: private-key-password + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD(+) + * description: Password for IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY. It can also go to "key-" + * lookaside file, or it can be owned by a secret agent. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:private-key-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:private-key-password + * property. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: private-key-password-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS(+) + * format: NMSettingSecretFlags + * description: Password flags for IEEE_8021X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD password. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key: + * + * Contains the "phase 2" inner private key when the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-auth or #NMSetting8021x:phase2-autheap property is + * set to "tls". + * + * Key data is specified using a "scheme"; two are currently supported: blob + * and path. When using the blob scheme and private keys, this property + * should be set to the key's encrypted PEM encoded data. When using private + * keys with the path scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 + * encoded path of the key, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending + * with a terminating NUL byte. When using PKCS#<!-- -->12 format private + * keys and the blob scheme, this property should be set to the + * PKCS#<!-- -->12 data and the #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password + * property must be set to password used to decrypt the PKCS#<!-- -->12 + * certificate and key. When using PKCS#<!-- -->12 files and the path + * scheme, this property should be set to the full UTF-8 encoded path of the + * key, prefixed with the string "file://" and ending with a terminating + * NUL byte, and as with the blob scheme the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password property must be set to the + * password used to decode the PKCS#<!-- -->12 private key and certificate. + * + * Setting this property directly is discouraged; use the + * nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_private_key() function instead. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-private-key + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_PRIVATE_KEY(+) + * description: Private key for inner authentication method for EAP-TLS. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY] = + g_param_spec_boxed(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY, + "", + "", + G_TYPE_BYTES, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password: + * + * The password used to decrypt the "phase 2" private key specified in the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key property when the private key either + * uses the path scheme, or is a PKCS#<!-- -->12 format key. Setting this + * property directly is not generally necessary except when returning + * secrets to NetworkManager; it is generally set automatically when setting + * the private key by the nm_setting_802_1x_set_phase2_private_key() + * function. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-private-key-password + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD(+) + * description: Password for IEEE_8021X_INNER_PRIVATE_KEY. It can also go to "key-" + * lookaside file, or it can be owned by a secret agent. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-private-key-password property. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: phase2-private-key-password-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_INNER_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS(+) + * format: NMSettingSecretFlags + * description: Password flags for IEEE_8021X_INNER_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD password. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS] = + g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PHASE2_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:pin: + * + * PIN used for EAP authentication methods. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: pin + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PIN(+) + * description: The pin secret used for EAP authentication methods. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PIN] = + g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PIN, + "", + "", + NULL, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:pin-flags: + * + * Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSetting8021x:pin property. + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: pin-flags + * variable: IEEE_8021X_PIN_FLAGS(+) + * description: The secret flags for the pin property. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_PIN_FLAGS] = g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_802_1X_PIN_FLAGS, + "", + "", + NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS, + NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:system-ca-certs: + * + * When %TRUE, overrides the #NMSetting8021x:ca-path and + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-path properties using the system CA directory + * specified at configure time with the --system-ca-path switch. The + * certificates in this directory are added to the verification chain in + * addition to any certificates specified by the #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert and + * #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert properties. If the path provided with + * --system-ca-path is rather a file name (bundle of trusted CA certificates), + * it overrides #NMSetting8021x:ca-cert and #NMSetting8021x:phase2-ca-cert + * properties instead (sets ca_cert/ca_cert2 options for wpa_supplicant). + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: system-ca-certs + * variable: IEEE_8021X_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS(+) + * description: a boolean value. + * ---end--- + */ + _nm_setting_property_define_boolean(properties_override, + obj_properties, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS, + PROP_SYSTEM_CA_CERTS, + FALSE, + NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE, + nm_setting_802_1x_get_system_ca_certs); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:auth-timeout: + * + * A timeout for the authentication. Zero means the global default; if the + * global default is not set, the authentication timeout is 25 seconds. + * + * Since: 1.8 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: auth-timeout + * variable: IEEE_8021X_AUTH_TIMEOUT(+) + * default: 0 + * description: Timeout in seconds for the 802.1X authentication. Zero means the global default or 25. + * ---end--- + */ + obj_properties[PROP_AUTH_TIMEOUT] = g_param_spec_int( + NM_SETTING_802_1X_AUTH_TIMEOUT, + "", + "", + 0, + G_MAXINT32, + 0, + G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_FUZZY_IGNORE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS); + + /** + * NMSetting8021x:optional: + * + * Whether the 802.1X authentication is optional. If %TRUE, the activation + * will continue even after a timeout or an authentication failure. Setting + * the property to %TRUE is currently allowed only for Ethernet connections. + * If set to %FALSE, the activation can continue only after a successful + * authentication. + * + * Since: 1.22 + **/ + /* ---ifcfg-rh--- + * property: optional + * variable: IEEE_8021X_OPTIONAL(+) + * default=no + * description: whether the 802.1X authentication is optional + * ---end--- + */ + _nm_setting_property_define_boolean(properties_override, + obj_properties, + NM_SETTING_802_1X_OPTIONAL, + PROP_OPTIONAL, + FALSE, + NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE, + nm_setting_802_1x_get_optional); + + g_object_class_install_properties(object_class, _PROPERTY_ENUMS_LAST, obj_properties); + + _nm_setting_class_commit_full(setting_class, + NM_META_SETTING_TYPE_802_1X, + NULL, + properties_override); +} |